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INTRODUCTION
In June 2009, less than a month after the Supreme Court decided
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 1 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg told her audience at
the Second Circuit Judicial Conference that, in her opinion, “the
Court’s majority messed up the Federal Rules.” 2 Justice Ginsburg’s
comment was a sign of the federal courts’ growing struggle with Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 3 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, two cases that
transformed the requirements for pleadings in all civil cases under the

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology.
1
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
2
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States,
Remarks for Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp
_ 06-12-09.html.
3
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 In Twombly, a complex anti-trust
case, the Supreme Court introduced plausibility as a new requirement
for pleadings. 5 The Court in Twombly held that a complaint must state
“a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to meet the requirements
of Rule 8(a)(2) 6 and to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 7 motion to dismiss. 8
Two years later in Iqbal, a less complex discrimination case, the Court
confirmed that the new plausibility requirement applies to “all civil
actions.” 9
Swanson v. Citibank, 10 a case that the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided on July 30, 2010, reveals just how “messed
up” things have become. In Swanson, a pro se plaintiff sued Citibank,
a real estate appraisal company, and the appraisal company’s
employee for racial discrimination in connection with Citibank’s
denial of her application for a home equity loan. 11 The district court
dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
plausible claim, 12 but the court of appeals reversed. 13 Writing for the
majority, Judge Diane Wood interpreted Twombly and Iqbal to mean
that a complaint must include sufficient factual detail to “present a
story that holds together.” 14 In dissent, Judge Posner strongly
criticized the majority’s liberal reading of Twombly and Iqbal and
4

The Supreme Court in Iqbal transformed the pleading requirements by
confirming that the “plausibility” requirement from Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570,
applied to “all civil actions.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
5
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
6
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must
contain: . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief”).
7
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (“a party may assert the following defenses by
motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
8
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
9
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
10
614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010).
11
Id. at 402.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 407.
14
Id. at 404.
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interpreted the two cases to mean that a complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations to override any “obvious alternative
explanation” for the plaintiff’s injury. 15 While the majority held that
the plaintiff’s relatively minimalist complaint was sufficient to state a
plausible claim, 16 Judge Poser thought that “error” was the more
obvious and natural explanation for the defendants’ denial of the
plaintiff’s home equity loan application. 17 Judge Posner argued that
the court should have relied on its “judicial experience and common
sense” to reach this conclusion, and that the district court’s dismissal
should have been affirmed. 18
The majority and dissenting opinions in Swanson reveal the strong
disagreement in the Seventh Circuit over how courts should interpret
and apply Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement. This Note
will examine this disagreement and will ultimately argue that Judge
Diane Wood’s majority opinion provides the correct approach. After
providing a history of pleading in general and of pleading in the
Seventh Circuit in particular, this Note will argue that, in deciding
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, judges must be careful to not overly
rely on their “judicial experience and common sense” such that they
effectively turn a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. 19 Instead, as the court held in Swanson, the question judges
must ask themselves when deciding whether a complaint presents a
claim that is “plausible on its face” is whether the factual allegations,
taken as true, “present a story that holds together” and upon which the
plaintiff could recover. 20 In assessing this, a judge should look to his
15

Id. at 407–08 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1951–52 (2010)).
16
Id. at 405.
17
Id. at 408.
18
Id. at 407–09.
19
See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Twombly and Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17 (2010). This
Note will heavily rely on the arguments of Professor Suja A. Thomas, who has
argued that Twombly and Iqbal have effectively turned the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss into the “new summary judgment motion.” Id.
20
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404.
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or her “judicial experience and common sense” only for an objective
standard, not as a source for facts or considerations beyond the
allegations of the complaint upon which to base inferences that favor
the party moving for dismissal. 21 In the end, this Note argues that the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the correct result in
Swanson.
I.

HISTORY OF PLEADING RULES

Professors Kevin M. Clermont and Stephen C. Yeazell have
called pleading “the gatekeeper for civil litigation.” 22 If pleading is the
gatekeeper, then prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938, judges were quick to close the gates on plaintiffs’
claims because they followed technical pleading rules. 23 For the
second half of the twentieth century, on the other hand, federal judges
held the gates open because they followed the liberal notice pleading
standard that the Supreme Court introduced in Conley v. Gibson. 24

21

See infra Part IV.
Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing
Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 824 (2010) (“Pleading serves as the gatekeeper for
civil litigation.”); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202 (2004 ed. & 2009 supp.) (describing the four
functions traditionally served by pleadings, one of which was to provide “a means
for speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses”).
23
See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (“At common law there was a
generally held belief in the efficacy of pleadings. The whole grand scheme was
premised on the assumption that by proceeding through a maze of rigid, and often
numerous, stages of denial, avoidance, or demurrer, eventually the dispute would be
reduced to a single issue of law or fact that would dispose of the case.”); see also
David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 390, 395 (1980) (describing the Field Code as a “scheme [that] placed
considerable emphasis on hypertechnical artifices of pleading . . . [under which] any
gains in precise issue-identification came at the expense of many otherwise valid
claims that were dismissed for inadequate pleadings”).
24
355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (holding that a complaint need only contain “‘a
short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”) (quoting FED. R.
22
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Very recently, the gatekeeper has become selective again. According
to Clermont and Yeazell, the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal
developed “a robust gatekeeping regime” to replace liberal notice
pleading. 25 To understand how pleading rules have evolved in this
manner, it is necessary to give a brief overview of the history of
pleading rules.
A. 1848 to 1938: The Field Code 26
The Field Code was the first major departure from common law
pleading in the United States. 27 David Dudley Field developed the
Field Code during the mid-nineteenth century to reform the New York
courts’ approach to pleading. 28 The Field Code provided that a
complaint should contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition,
and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding
to know what is intended.” 29 Plaintiffs were required to plead the “dry,
naked, actual facts” giving rise to a cause of action. 30 During its time,

CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 825 (“Under the
[Federal] Rules [of Civil Procedure] . . . pleading was a pervious gate.”).
25
Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 823 (describing the Court’s decisions
in Twombly and Iqbal as a “choice to replace minimal notice pleading with a robust
gatekeeping regime”).
26
The Field Code was adopted in New York in 1848. Richard L. Marcus, The
Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 433, 438 (1986). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.
Id. at 433.
27
Id. at 438.
28
Id. at 438–39.
29
Id. (quoting An Act to simplify and abridge the Practice, Pleadings and
Proceedings of the Courts of this State, ch. 379, § 120(2), 1848 N.Y. Laws 521).
30
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (quoting POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
§ 423 at 640 (5th ed. 1929)). Prior to the Field Code, plaintiffs were required under
the common law to plead technical causes of action. Hon. Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 459 (1943) (“With the development of code
pleading . . . the emphasis was shifted from the detailed issue-pleading of the

5
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the Field Code was the rule of procedure in effect in many federal
courts because, from 1872 to 1938, the Conformity Act provided that
each federal court was to employ the pleading rules of the state in
which it was located. 31
Although the Field Code aimed for simplicity, states that adopted
it ultimately developed a complicated system that distinguished
between “legal conclusions,” “ultimate facts,” and “evidentiary
facts.” 32 Pleading of legal conclusions and evidentiary facts was
impermissible, while pleading of ultimate facts was desired. 33 Cases
were often dismissed based upon technical distinctions between legal
conclusions and ultimate facts, rather than on the merits. 34 A
widespread criticism of the Field Code’s distinction between legal
conclusions and ultimate facts was that there was no logical distinction
to be made; because the difference was one of degree only, rather than
of kind, the distinction was arbitrary. 35
B. 1938 to 2007: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and
Liberal Notice Pleading
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to
avoid the confusing distinction between “legal conclusions,” “ultimate
facts,” and “evidentiary facts” that had mired pleadings under the
Field Code. 36 Charles E. Clark and the drafters of the Federal Rules
advocated a liberal approach to pleading. 37 Accordingly, the Federal
common law to a statement of facts, so simple, it was said at the time, that even a
child could write a letter to the court telling of its case.”).
31
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22, at n.4.
32
Roberts, supra note 23, at 395; see also Marcus, supra note 26, at 438.
33
Roberts, supra note 23, at 395.
34
Id. at 395–96.
35
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22; see also CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 38 at 301 (2d ed. 1947) (“[T]he attempted
distinction between facts, law, and evidence, viewed as anything other than a
convenient distinction of degree, seems philosophically and logically unsound.”).
36
Marcus, supra note 26, at 438–39.
37
Id. at 439.
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Rules, adopted in 1938, substantially narrowed the function served by
pleadings. 38 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a
complaint need only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 39 The other functions
that pleadings historically served—stating the facts, narrowing the
issues, and “providing a means for speedy disposition of sham claims
and insubstantial defenses”—were left to devices other than pleadings,
including discovery, pretrial conferences, and summary judgment. 40
The Federal Rules’ liberal approach to pleading became known as
“notice pleading” following the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in
Conley v. Gibson. 41 In Conley, several African-American union
members brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunction
against their union representative. 42 The plaintiffs alleged that the
representative, as their collective bargaining agent, had failed to
protect the African-American union members from discriminatory
discharge in favor of white employees, in violation of the Railway
Labor Act. 43 The district court dismissed the complaint, and the court
of appeals affirmed. 44
The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ complaint. 45 The Supreme Court famously held that a
38

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22 (“Because the only function left
exclusively to the pleadings by the federal rules is that of giving notice, federal
courts have frequently said that the rules have adopted a system of ‘notice
pleading.’”).
39
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
40
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 22.
41
355 U.S. 41 (1957). A similarly high water mark came in Dioguardi v.
Durning, where Justice Charles E. Clark, former head of the drafting committee of
the Federal Rules, reversed the dismissal of a pro se complaint because, although
“obviously home drawn” and “however inarticulately they may be stated, the
plaintiff has disclosed his claims . . . [and the court does] not see how the plaintiff
may properly be deprived of his day in court to show what he obviously so firmly
believes.” 139 F.2d 774, 774–75 (2d Cir. 1944).
42
Conley, 355 U.S. at 42–43.
43
Id. at 43.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 44.
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complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 8(a)(2) “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” 46 This sentence
has become known as Conley’s “no set of facts” language. 47 The
Conley Court went on to hold that the Federal Rules do not require
plaintiffs to fill their complaints will detailed factual allegations, but
instead require only “a short and plain statement of the claim” that is
sufficient to give the opposing party “fair notice” of the claim and “the
grounds upon which it rests.” 48 The Court’s holding in Conley became
the precedent for a half-century of liberal notice pleading in federal
courts. 49
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Conley’s liberal notice pleading
standard as recently as 2002. 50 In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the plaintiff
alleged that his employer had demoted and fired him based on his
national origin and age. 51 The district court dismissed the complaint
on grounds that the plaintiff had not alleged sufficient facts to
establish a discrimination claim. 52 The court of appeals affirmed,
reasoning that a discrimination claim in the Second Circuit must
contain more than mere “naked assertions” to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 53 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
Second Circuit’s heightened pleading requirement did not comport
with the liberal notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2). 54 Although
the Supreme Court reaffirmed liberal notice pleading as recently as
Swierkiewicz, the Court has since changed course.
46

Id. at 45–46.
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007).
48
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
49
Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard remained in full force until the
Supreme Court retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
50
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
51
Id. at 508–09.
52
Id. at 509.
53
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, No. 00-9010, 2001 WL 245077, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar.
12, 2001) (unpublished).
54
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.
47
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C. 2007 to the Present: A Trio of Cases that Transformed Pleading
(or that “Messed up the Federal Rules”)
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court fundamentally altered its interpretation of what Rule
8(a)(2) requires of pleadings. In Twombly, the Court retired Conley’s
“no set of facts” language and held that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a
complaint contain sufficient factual allegations to state “a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” 55 In Iqbal, the Court held that this
new plausibility requirement applies to “all civil actions.” 56 Yet,
between its decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court issued a per
curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus, 57 in which it held that Conley’s
“notice pleading” language was still good law following Twombly. 58
1.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly

The Court first introduced plausibility as a new requirement for
pleadings in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. 59 The plaintiffs in
Twombly were the class of all individuals who had subscribed to
telephone service since 1996 from the Baby Bells, which were the
local telephone service providers that survived after the break-up of
AT&T in 1984. 60 The plaintiffs alleged that several of the Baby Bells
had engaged in parallel conduct in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
which proscribes any “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce.” 61 The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that it alleged parallel conduct but did
not allege the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy in
55

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
57
551 U.S. 89 (2007).
58
Id. at 93.
59
550 U.S. at 570.
60
Id. at 550.
61
Id. at 548 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).
56

9
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restraint of trade. 62 The Second Circuit reversed, relying on Conley to
hold that dismissal was improper because the defendants had not
proven that there was “no set of facts” that could entitle the plaintiffs
to relief. 63
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that the
plaintiffs’ complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 64 In so doing, the Court departed from a half-century of
permitting lower courts to apply a “focused and literal reading” of
Conley’s “no set of facts” language. 65 The Court stated that it no
longer sufficed for a complaint to merely reveal “the theory of the
claim.” 66 Instead, the Court interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) to require that a
complaint contain sufficient allegations “to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” 67 Although the Court noted that a complaint
still need not contain specific facts beyond those necessary to state a
claim and give fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it
rests, 68 the Court held that a complaint must contain sufficient facts to
move the claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 69
Filling a complaint with “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not get the claim
over the line. 70
The Supreme Court went on to hold that Conley’s “no set of
facts” language had earned its retirement. 71 The Court criticized the
“focused and literal reading” of Conley that permitted conclusory
62

Id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
64
Id. at 570.
65
Cf. id. at 561–63. The Court in Twombly discussed and criticized the Court
of Appeals’ “focused and literal reading of Conley’s ‘no set of facts’” language, id.
at 561–62, but recognized that “we have not previously explained the circumstances
and rejected the literal interpretation of the [‘no set of facts’] passage,” id. at 563 n.8.
66
Id. at 561.
67
Id. at 570.
68
Id. at 555.
69
Id. at 570.
70
Id. at 555.
71
Id. at 563.
63

10
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claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 72 Under that
reading, a complaint would survive as long as there was some chance
that the plaintiff could later prove some previously undisclosed facts to
support his or her claim. 73 The Court said that courts taking this
approach had misinterpreted the long-accepted rule that “once a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of
facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” 74 This longheld rule was meant to describe “the breadth of opportunity to prove
what an adequate complaint claims, not the minimum standard of
adequate pleading to govern a complaint.” 75
The Court in Twombly held that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not
state a plausible claim. 76 The Court reasoned that the “natural
explanation” for the defendants’ alleged parallel conduct was not that
the defendants had entered into an illegal anti-competitive
agreement. 77 Rather, the Court reasoned that the more natural
explanation was that the local telephone service providers had merely
continued their monopolistic behavior in their respective markets after
the government had ordered the AT&T Company broken up in 1984. 78
Because the allegations did nothing to override this more natural
explanation, the Court held that the complaint did not “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face” and should have been dismissed. 79
2.

Erickson v. Pardus

Two weeks after the Supreme Court retired Conley’s “no set of
facts” language and ushered in plausibility as a new requirement for
pleadings, the Court issued a per curiam opinion that cast significant
72

Id. at 561.
Id.
74
Id. at 563.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 570.
77
Id. at 564.
78
Id. at 568.
79
Id. at 570.
73

11
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doubt on the transformative nature of Twombly. 80 In Erickson v.
Pardus, a prisoner filed a pro se suit against several prison officials for
terminating his treatment program for hepatitis C in violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 81 The district court dismissed his complaint, holding that
it contained only conclusory allegations that the plaintiff had suffered
an “independent cognizable harm” as a result of the defendants’
termination of his treatment. 82 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed. 83
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals
erred when it held that the plaintiff’s allegations “were too
conclusory” to state a claim to relief. 84 In reaching its holding, the
Court made no mention of Twombly’s plausibility requirement. 85
Rather, the Court reiterated that Rule 8(a)(2) imposes a “liberal
pleading standard.” 86 The Court cited Twombly (which was citing
Conley) for the rule that, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint need only
give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which
it rests. 87 Thus, despite overruling Conley’s “no set of facts” language
two weeks earlier, 88 the Court held that Conley’s “notice pleading”
language was still good law. 89 Following the Court’s decision in
Erickson, many courts interpreted it to mean that Twombly’s
plausibility requirement was limited to complex anti-trust cases. 90
80

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
Id. at 89–90.
82
Id. at 92–93.
83
Id. at 92–93.
84
Id. at 93.
85
See id. at 89–95.
86
Id. at 94.
87
Id. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957))).
88
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
89
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93.
90
See, e.g., Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . . put to rest any concern
that Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the federal courts.”).
81

12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/2

12

Grattan: The Gatekeepers Keep Changing the Locks: <em>Swanson v. Citibank<

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

3.

Fall 2010

Ashcroft v. Iqbal

The next development came in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in which the
Supreme Court dispelled everyone’s doubts concerning the scope of
Twombly’s holding and held that the plausibility requirement applies
to “all civil actions.” 91 In Iqbal, the plaintiff, who was a Pakistani and
a Muslim, sued former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI
Director Robert Mueller for adopting a discriminatory policy of
detaining Arab Muslim men in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. 92 Following the September 11 attacks, Iqbal had been detained
on charges of identification fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United
States. 93 He had been deemed to be “of high interest” to the
investigation into the attacks and had been held in a maximumsecurity prison. 94 The plaintiff alleged that Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s
policies led to him being confined on account of his race, religion, or
national origin. 95
The defendants in Iqbal filed their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss before the Supreme Court decided Twombly. 96 As a result, the
district court denied the defendant’s motion, relying on Conley’s “no
set of facts” language. 97 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme
Court decided Twombly while the appeal was pending. 98 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed Twombly but held that its
plausibility requirement applied only to complex cases in which
additional detail would prove helpful. 99 The court of appeals did not

91

129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
Id. at 1942.
93
Id. at 1943.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1944.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
92

13
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

13

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

consider Iqbal to be such a case, so it affirmed the district court’s
ruling. 100
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 101 First, the
Court held that the plausibility requirement from Twombly applies to
“all civil actions.” 102 Next, the Court described the plausibility
requirement as a two-pronged test for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss. 103 The first prong is to disregard legal conclusions, or
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” 104 The
Court explained that, although Rule 8(a)(2) was a major departure
from the technical requirements of the code-pleading era, “it does not
unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more
than conclusions.” 105 The second prong is to presume all remaining
well-pleaded facts to be true and to dismiss any complaint that does
not “state a plausible claim for relief.” 106 The Court said that the task
of determining whether a claim is plausible requires the court “to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.” 107
Applying the first prong to the complaint in Iqbal, the Court
disregarded two allegations because they were legal conclusions. First,
the Court disregarded the allegation that Attorney General John
Ashcroft and FBI Director Dan Mueller knowingly, willfully, and
maliciously agreed to detain Iqbal on account of his religion, race, or
national origin “as a matter of policy . . . and for no legitimate
penological interest.” 108 Second, the Court disregarded the allegation
that Attorney General Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the
policy and that FBI Director Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting
100

Id.
Id. at 1945.
102
Id. at 1953 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (stating that Rule 8 “governs the
pleading standard ‘in all civil actions in the United States district courts’”).
103
Id. at 1949–50.
104
Id. at 1949.
105
Id. at 1950.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 1951.
101
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and executing it. 109 The Court considered these allegations to be
“formulaic recitation[s] of the elements” of a constitutional
discrimination claim. 110
Applying the second prong of its test to Iqbal’s complaint, the
Court assumed to be true the plaintiff’s factual allegations that FBI
Director Mueller directed the FBI to arrest and detain “thousands of
Arab Muslim men” during its investigation into the September 11
attacks and that the policy of detaining these men “in highly restrictive
conditions” was approved by Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI
director Mueller. 111 The Court held that, even taking these allegations
to be true, the plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for relief. 112
The Court reasoned that the allegations had an “obvious alternative
explanation,” namely, that the arrests were lawful and were motivated
by a “nondiscriminatory intent” to hold in custody persons who may
have had connections to the Al Qaeda members who committed the
Septermber 11 attacks. 113 Just as it had in Twombly, the Court
considered the plaintiff’s claim to be implausible in light of this more
obvious explanation. 114
II. SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS BEFORE AND AFTER TWOMBLY AND
IQBAL
A. Seventh Circuit Cases Prior to Twombly
Prior to Twombly, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
was a strict devotee of Conley’s liberal notice pleading standard. 115
109

Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567 (2007)).
114
Id.
115
See, e.g., Riley v. Vilsack, 665 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000–01 (W.D. Wis. 2009)
(noting that, prior to Twombly, “the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
interpreted Rule 8 to require plaintiffs to do no more than provide enough notice to
allow the defendant to file an answer. . . . Plaintiffs did not need to plead facts for
110
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The case of Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago exemplifies the
Seventh Circuit’s pre-Twombly approach. 116 In Vincent, the author of a
book on buying foreclosures sued the City Colleges of Chicago and
the publisher of the book for alleged violations of the federal copyright
and trademark laws. 117 The City Colleges of Chicago had offered a
course under the same name as the book’s title, and the publisher had
continued publishing the book without the author’s permission and
without paying her royalties. 118 The district court dismissed most of
the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding defective, among other
things, the complaint’s failure to include the plaintiff’s registered U.S.
Patent and Trademark numbers. 119
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.120 Writing
for the court, Judge Easterbrook provided a terse and strongly worded
summary of the Seventh Circuit’s approach to notice pleading under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2):
[A] judicial order dismissing a complaint because the plaintiff
did not plead facts has a short half-life. “Any decision
declaring ‘this complaint is deficient because it does not
allege X’ is a candidate for summary reversal . . . . Civil Rule
8 calls for a short and plain statement; the plaintiff pleads
claims, not facts or legal theories. . . . Factual detail comes
later—perhaps in a motion for a more definite statement, . . .
perhaps in response to a motion for summary judgment. Until
then, the possibility that facts to be adduced later, and
consistent with the complaint, could prove the claim, is
enough for the litigation to move forward. 121
each element of a claim. . . . A complaint could ‘not be dismissed on the ground that
it is conclusory or fails to allege facts.’”) (citations omitted).
116
485 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2007).
117
Id. at 921.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 922–24.
120
Id. at 926.
121
Id. at 923 (citations omitted).
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Judge Easterbrook went on to reason that, although a plaintiff must
ultimately prove some fact at trial, the plaintiff does not have to allege
that fact in his or her complaint. 122 After noting that Rule 8(a)(2) was
adopted in 1938 and that Conley v. Gibson emphasized that the Rule
does not impose a strong fact-pleading requirement, 123 Judge
Easterbrook reprimanded the district judge for granting the
defendant’s motion to dismiss: “It is disappointing to see a federal
district judge dismiss a complaint for failure to adhere to a factpleading model that federal practice abrogated almost 70 years
ago.” 124
There were numerous other cases prior to Twombly in which the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). 125 Just two weeks after Judge Easterbrook handed down his
decision in Vincent, however, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly.

122

Id. at 923–24.
Id. at 924.
124
Id.
125
See, e.g., id. at n.† (citing twelve cases in the year prior to Vincent in which
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed decisions that had dismissed
complaints for failure to state a claim: Christensen v. Boone County, 483 F.3d 454,
465–66 (7th Cir. 2007); Miller v. Fisher, 2007 WL 755187 (7th Cir. Mar. 12, 2007);
Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007); Thomas v. Kalu, 2007 WL 648312
(7th Cir. 2007); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Broadspire Servs., Inc., 209 F. App’x 573 (7th
Cir. 2006); Tompkins v. The Women's Cmty., Inc., 203 F. App’x 743 (7th Cir.
2006); McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2006); Hefferman v. Bass, 467
F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2006); Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2006); Floyd v. Aden,
184 F. App’x. 575 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006);
Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006)).
123

17
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2010

17

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

B. Seventh Circuit Cases Following Twombly but Preceding Iqbal
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit took a narrow view
of Twombly prior to Iqbal. 126 In many instances, the court relied on
Erickson v. Pardus to support its narrow reading. 127 The court’s
interpretation of Twombly in Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T
Mobility provides a good example of this.128 In Airborne, the plaintiff
sued a cell phone service provider for breach of an “authorized dealer
agreement” after the provider stopped paying commissions on
activations of new cell phone plans. 129 After the district court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint four times over the course of three
years, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth
amended complaint. 130 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 131
Writing for the court in Airborne, Judge Diane Wood addressed
the standard for pleadings under Rule 8(a)(2) following Twombly. 132
Judge Wood noted that the Supreme Court in Twombly held that a
complaint must not contain merely “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 133 But Judge
Wood went on to say that the Court’s decision in Erickson, decided
two weeks after Twombly, confirmed that liberal notice pleading had

126

Riley v. Vilsack, 665 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000–01 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (“The
court of appeals acknowledged that Twombly ‘retooled federal pleading
standards,’ . . . but in most cases the court declined to revisit previous holdings in
light of the new case, adhering to the view that Rule 8 required nothing more than
‘fair notice.’”).
127
E.g., Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The
Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . . put to rest any concern that
Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the federal courts.”).
128
499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007).
129
Id. at 664.
130
Id. at 664–66.
131
Id. at 668.
132
Id. at 667.
133
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
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not been replaced by a fact-pleading regime. 134 Thus, in Judge Wood’s
view, lack of plausibility under Twombly merely equated to a
complaint that was “so sketchy” as to provide insufficient notice of the
nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. 135 Because the
appellant did not raise this issue on appeal, however, Judge Wood
affirmed the district court on other grounds. 136
EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, Inc. 137 is another interesting
post-Twombly case; however, in Concentra, the complaint failed to
meet the liberal notice pleading standard despite the Seventh Circuit’s
narrow reading of Twombly. 138 In Concentra, an employee had filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), alleging that Concentra fired him in retaliation for reporting
two co-workers’ sexual affair. 139 The EEOC subsequently filed suit
against Concentra for retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act. 140 The district court dismissed the original
complaint because it held that the employee’s report of the affair was
not protected under Title VII. 141 The EEOC subsequently filed an
amended complaint, which was “markedly less detailed” and that did
not include the specific facts contained in the employee’s report to the
EEOC. 142 The district court dismissed the amended complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the

134

Id.
Judge Wood concluded as follows: “Taking Erickson and Twombly
together, we understand the Court to be saying only that at some point the factual
detail in a complaint may be so sketchy that the complaint does not provide the type
of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled under Rule 8.” Id.
136
Id.
137
496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007).
138
Id. at 781.
139
Id. at 775.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
135
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EEOC appealed. 143 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. 144
Judge Cudahy wrote the majority opinion and held that the
complaint failed to provide the notice required under Rule 8(a)(2). 145
Judge Cudahy read Twombly “to impose two easy-to-clear hurdles.” 146
The first hurdle is to meet Conley’s requirement of giving the
defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it
rests. 147 The second hurdle is to plead factual allegations that bring the
plaintiff’s claim beyond the “speculative” level to the level of
“plausible.” 148
Applying this standard to the plaintiff’s complaint in Concentra,
Judge Cudahy addressed the second hurdle first. 149 Surprisingly, Judge
Cudahy suggested that the EEOC had not failed to state a plausible
claim even with its barebones complaint. 150 Instead, Judge Cudahy
reasoned that plausibility was a low threshold. 151 Referring to the facts
of Erickson v. Pardus, Judge Cudahy reasoned that the plaintiff’s
retaliation claim seemed “no less plausible than that a prison doctor
might improperly withhold desperately needed medication.” 152 Thus,
just like Judge Wood in Airborne, 153 Judge Cudahy relied on Erickson
v. Pardus to support a narrow reading of Twombly. 154
143

Id.
Id.
145
Id. at 781.
146
Id. at 776.
147
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
148
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
149
Id. at 777.
150
See id. at 777–79. This was in part because “Concentra does not contend
that the bare allegations of the amended complaints’ seventh paragraph fail to
plausibly suggest a right to relief.” Id. at 777.
151
Id. at 777 n.1.
152
Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 89–91 (2007).
153
Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.
2007).
154
Concentra, 496 F.3d at 777 n.1.
144
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Returning to the first hurdle, Judge Cudahy then wrote that a
complaint must contain “very minimal” factual detail to satisfy the
notice requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). 155 Judge Cudahy held that the
EEOC’s complaint was too minimal to provide fair notice, however. 156
He pointed out that, after the EEOC’s original complaint had been
dismissed for failure to state a claim, the EEOC had merely deleted
information from its complaint to “disguise the nature of the claim
before the court.” 157 Judge Cudahy wrote that this practice of
“obfuscation” was inconsistent with the principles of notice pleading,
and, therefore, the complaint was properly dismissed. 158
While the court’s holding in Concentra that the EEOC’s
complaint did not provide sufficient notice because it was too vague
and obfuscated seems correct, Concentra says a lot about the Seventh
Circuit’s view of plausibility following Twombly. Judge Cudahy
suggested that the EEOC’s barebones complaint 159 stated a plausible
claim 160 even though the complaint was too vague to provide fair
notice. 161 This suggests that, even though Judge Cudahy saw the two
“hurdles” facing pleadings to be “easy to clear,” he may have
considered providing fair notice to be a higher hurdle than stating a

155

Id. at 779 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007))
(stating that the “classic verbal formulation” of Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirements is that
the complaint “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests”).
156
Id. at 781.
157
Id. at 780.
158
Id. at 780–81.
159
Id. at 780 (“The claim itself was set forth in less than a page and the critical
details were contained in a single eight-line paragraph, the very paragraph targeted
for excision in the amended complaint.”).
160
Id. at 777 n.1.
161
Id. at 781.
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plausible claim. 162 This is contrary to the widely held view that the
Supreme Court raised the bar when it decided Twombly. 163
In one last post-Twombly, pre-Iqbal case, Judge Posner adhered to
a fairly narrow reading of Twombly but held that it applied it to a
complex case brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). 164 The court’s holding in Limestone
Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont, Illinois comports with the
view—which was widely held prior to Iqbal—that Twombly’s holding
applied only to complex cases. In Limestone, the plaintiff sued a
number of defendants, including the village in which his property was
located, the mayor of the village, and the local park district, for acting
in concert to prevent the plaintiff from developing his property, which
resulted in the sale of the property at a loss. 165 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants’ coordinated conduct violated RICO. 166 The
district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and
the court of appeals affirmed. 167
Judge Posner reasoned that, although Twombly “must not be overread,” the principle underlying its holding is that defendants “should
not be forced to undergo costly discovery” unless a complaint shows
“that the plaintiff has a substantial case.” 168 Judge Posner held that this
principle is applicable to a RICO case, which is complex like the
antitrust case that was the subject of Twombly. 169 Judge Posner held
that dismissal of the complaint was proper because the plaintiff’s
allegations were “threadbare” and contained no indication of “a
162

See id. at 776–77, 777 n.1, 780–81.
See e.g., Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[t]he
question with which courts are still struggling is how much higher the Supreme
Court meant to set the bar”).
164
Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, Ill., 520 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir.
2008).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 802–05.
168
Id. at 802–03.
169
Id. at 803.
163
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structure of any kind,” which is necessary to state a claim under
RICO. 170
C. Seventh Circuit Cases Following Iqbal
After the Supreme Court held in Ashcroft v. Iqbal that Twombly’s
plausibility requirement applies “to all civil actions,” 171 one would
imagine that courts would stop reading Twombly narrowly. However,
in Smith v. Duffey, one of the first Seventh Circuit cases decided
following Iqbal, Judge Posner continued to take a narrow view of
Twombly and declined to apply either Twombly or Iqbal to the facts of
the case. 172 In Smith, the plaintiff sued his former employer for fraud
in connection with cancellation of stock options in the employer’s
Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. 173 Prior to his employer’s
bankruptcy, the plaintiff had signed a termination agreement and
received a $1.4 million severance. 174 After he discovered that his stock
options were extinguished in the reorganization, the employee sued. 175
He alleged that, had the defendants told him that his stock options
were to be extinguished in the bankruptcy, he would have demanded a
higher severance. 176 The district court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. 177
Writing for the majority, Judge Posner held that the plaintiff had
not stated a claim for fraud where he was in a weak bargaining
position and where it would have been highly unlikely that he could
have demanded a higher severance in exchange for his stock

170

Id. at 803–05.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
172
See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (“So maybe neither
Bell Atlantic nor Iqbal governs here. It doesn’t matter.”).
173
Id. at 336–37.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 337.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 336, 339.
171
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options. 178 Judge Posner reasoned that the stock options were
valueless at the time the plaintiff received his severance and that any
reasonable businessperson would have known this. 179 Judge Posner
did not rely on Twombly or Iqbal, but instead reasoned that it was
apparent from the plaintiff’s complaint and arguments alone “that his
case has no merit.” 180
Even if the inadequacy of the plaintiff’s complaint was apparent,
Smith is significant because of Judge Posner’s proposed narrow
reading of Twombly and Iqbal. 181 In declining to apply either Twombly
or Iqbal to the facts of Smith, Judge Posner suggested that Twombly
was limited to complex litigation cases 182 and that Iqbal was limited to
cases in which the defendant had pleaded a defense of official
immunity. 183 This reading is consistent with the court’s trend preIqbal of reading Twombly narrowly.

178

Id. at 338–39.
Id.
180
Id. at 339–40.
181
See, e.g., Boroff v. Alza Corp., 685 F. Supp. 2d 704, 707 (N.D. Ohio 2010)
(citing Smith, 576 F.3d at 339–40) (“Questions as to the scope of the Iqbal and
Twombly pleading standards have generated much discussion among lawyers and
judges of late. . . . Judge Posner’s proposed (narrow) reading of Iqbal and Twombly
holds obvious appeal to lawyers and judges familiar with the venerable Conley
pleading standard. But it cannot be reconciled with the clear statement in Iqbal that
the Twombly standard applies to ‘all civil actions’”).
182
Smith, 576 F.3d at 339–340 (“In our initial thinking about the case,
however, we were reluctant to endorse the district court’s citation of the Supreme
Court’s decision in [Twombly], fast becoming the citation du jour in Rule 12(b)(6)
cases, as authority for the dismissal of this suit. The Court held that in complex
litigation . . . the defendant is not to be put to the cost of pretrial discovery . . . unless
the complaint says enough about the case to permit an inference that it may have real
merit. The present case, however, is not complex.”).
183
Id. at 340 (noting that Iqbal had extended the holding of Twombly to all
civil cases, but that, nonetheless, “Iqbal is special in its own way, because the
defendants had pleaded a defense of official immunity and the Court said that the
promise of minimally intrusive discovery ‘provides especially cold comfort in this
pleading context”) (emphasis in original).
179

24
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/2

24

Grattan: The Gatekeepers Keep Changing the Locks: <em>Swanson v. Citibank<

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

By the time the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided
Cooney v. Rossiter, 184 Judge Posner had become slightly more willing
to rely upon Twombly and Iqbal. 185 In Cooney, after the plaintiff lost
custody of her two children in a state court child custody proceeding,
she brought a § 1983 action pro se against the state court judge who
presided over the proceeding, against the court-appointed children’s
representative, and against the court-appointed children’s
psychiatrist. 186 During the child custody proceeding, the state court
judge had found that the plaintiff suffered from Munchausen
syndrome by proxy, which is a disorder in which “an individual
produces or feigns physical or emotional symptoms in another person
under his or her care.” 187 Based upon this finding, the judge had
granted custody to the children’s father. 188 In her subsequent federal
case, the mother alleged that the defendants had conspired together to
deprive her of numerous constitutional rights. 189 The district court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff
appealed. 190
Judge Posner wrote for the court and affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the complaint. 191 In reaching his holding, Judge Posner
took a slightly less narrow reading of Twombly and Iqbal than he had
in Smith v. Duffey. 192 However, even though Judge Posner
acknowledged that Iqbal extended Twombly’s plausibility requirement
184

583 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2009).
See id. at 971 (applying Twombly and Iqbal to a complaint alleging civil
conspiracy).
186
Id. at 969.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 970.
190
Id. at 969.
191
Id. at 972.
192
Compare Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009) (limiting
Twombly to complex cases and Iqbal to cases involving the defense of official
immunity), with Cooney, 583 F.3d at 971 (holding that the decision whether to apply
Twombly and Iqbal “is relative to the circumstances” and is not strictly limited to
those two situations).
185
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“to litigation in general,” 193 he did not take this to mean that the same
level of plausibility applies to all civil cases. 194 Instead, Judge Posner
reasoned that “the height of the pleading requirement is relative to the
circumstances.” 195
Under the circumstances of Cooney, Judge Posner felt that a high
standard of plausibility was warranted. 196 Judge Posner saw Cooney as
a case in which a “paranoid pro se” alleged that the parties involved in
a contentious child custody battle were guilty of a “vast [and]
encompassing conspiracy.” 197 Judge Posner held that, under these
circumstances, the complaint did not meet the requisite level of
plausibility and, therefore, was properly dismissed. 198
Finally, in Brooks v. Ross, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit continued to take a fairly narrow reading of Twombly and Iqbal
but affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a complaint. 199 In Brooks,
the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against members of the Illinois
Prison Review Board (PRB) and other state officials for malicious
prosecution, civil conspiracy, and other claims. 200 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants had conspired to indict him on charges of official
misconduct and wire fraud in connection with a 2002 PRB hearing, of
which the plaintiff was later acquitted. 201 The district court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the court of appeals
affirmed. 202
The opinion that Judge Diane Wood wrote for the court in Brooks
was reminiscent of her pre-Iqbal opinions. Judge Wood held that the
plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy and malicious prosecution did not
193

Cooney, 583 F.3d at 971.
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 972.
199
578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009).
200
Id. at 577–78.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 578, 582.
194
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 203 In reaching this
holding, Judge Wood reasoned that the allegations were too
conclusory and formulaic to give the defendants fair notice of the
plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which they rested. 204 Judge
Wood’s emphasis on the notice pleading aspect of Twombly and Iqbal
was similar to her approach in prior cases in which she interpreted
Twombly’s plausibility requirement to mean that some allegations may
be “so sketchy or implausible” that they fail to give sufficient
notice. 205
III. THE DEBATE HEATS UP: SWANSON V. CITIBANK
Until recently, the differing interpretations of Twombly and Iqbal
espoused by the judges on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit had not directly clashed. But that changed in Swanson v.
Citibank, where the plaintiff sued Citibank, a real estate appraisal
company, and the appraisal company’s employee for discrimination in
violation of the Fair Housing Act 206 after Citibank denied her
application for a home-equity loan. 207 The pro se plaintiff alleged that
the defendants had discriminated against her on the basis of race by
under-appraising her home for the purpose of denying her loan
application. 208 The district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)

203

Id. at 581–82.
Id.
205
See Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“Taking Erickson and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be
saying only that at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy
that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”); see also Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d
634, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . .
put to rest any concern that Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the
federal courts.”).
206
42 U.S.C. § 3605 (2006).
207
Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 2010).
208
Id.
204
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motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals reversed. 209 The court of
appeals held that, under Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff’s complaint
sufficiently stated a plausible claim upon which relief could be
granted. 210
Judge Diane Wood wrote for the majority in Swanson and read
Twombly and Iqbal very liberally. 211 Although Judge Wood’s reading
of Twombly and Iqbal did not change significantly from prior cases,
she stated her position more strongly than she had before. First, Judge
Wood began by acknowledging that courts are still struggling to
determine “how much higher the Supreme Court meant to set the bar”
when it decided Twomby and Iqbal. 212 She then repeated her oft-stated
position that, following the trio of Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal,
notice pleading is still the applicable standard in federal courts. 213
Next, she reasoned that notice pleading “is the light in which”
Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement must be read. 214 Judge
Wood held that, reading Twombly and Iqbal in this light, a complaint
must only include sufficient factual detail “to present a story that holds
together.” 215 Judge Wood explained that, in assessing this, judges
should ask themselves “could these things have happened, not did they
happen.” 216
Judge Wood further supported her liberal reading of Twombly and
Iqbal by reasoning that “[t]he Supreme Court’s explicit decision to
reaffirm the validity of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, which was cited with
approval in Twombly, indicates that in many straightforward cases, it
will not be any more difficult today for a plaintiff to meet [the
209

Id. at 402, 407.
Id. at 402–07. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s common-law fraud claims because her complaint failed to plead facts with
the particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9. Id. at 406.
211
See id. at 402–07.
212
Id. at 403 (citations omitted).
213
Id. at 404.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id.
210

28
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss1/2

28

Grattan: The Gatekeepers Keep Changing the Locks: <em>Swanson v. Citibank<

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 1

Fall 2010

requirements of notice pleading] . . . than it was before the Court’s
recent decisions.” 217 This may not be true in complex cases, Judge
Wood acknowledged, because complex cases “require more detail,
both to give the opposing party notice of what the case is all about and
to show how, in the plaintiff’s mind at least, the dots should be
connected.” 218
Applying her liberal reading of Twombly and Iqbal to the facts of
Swanson, Judge Wood held that the plaintiff’s complaint was
sufficiently detailed. 219 Judge Wood reasoned that the plaintiff’s
complaint, which identified the type of discrimination, who was
responsible for it, and when it occurred, included all it needed to give
the defendants fair notice of the claim and, thus, to survive a motion to
dismiss. 220
In dissent, Judge Richard Posner criticized the majority’s reading
of Twomby and Iqbal and, in a departure from prior cases, advocated
for a broader application of Twomby and Iqbal. 221 Instead of following
the narrow reading of Iqbal that he formulated in Smith v. Duffy 222 and
promulgated in Cooney v. Rossiter, 223 Judge Posner seemed to agree
this time that Iqbal was not limited to cases involving the defense of
qualified immunity, reasoning that the language of the Iqbal opinion
suggests that Iqbal was “a strong case for application of the Twombly
standard, rather than . . . the only type of discrimination case to which
the standard applies.” 224
Next, Judge Posner criticized the majority’s liberal reading of
Twombly and Iqbal. Judge Posner wrote that the majority’s reading
suggests “that discrimination cases are outside the scope of Iqbal,

217

Id. (citations omitted)
Id. at 405.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id. at 407–12 (Posner, J., dissenting).
222
576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009).
223
583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).
224
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 407 (Posner, J., dissenting).
218
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itself a discrimination case.” 225 Judge Posner pointed out that the
majority’s opinion distinguished between simple discrimination cases,
of which the majority required minimal allegations to survive a motion
to dismiss, and complex cases, of which the majority required more
detailed allegations. 226 Judge Posner agreed that requiring more detail
for the complex cases made sense, because Twombly itself was a
complex case. 227 But Judge Posner suggested that it was illogical to
lower the bar for even straightforward discrimination claims, because
Iqbal was a discrimination case, and it “was not especially
complex.” 228
Judge Posner went on to offer his own interpretation of Twombly
and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement. He read Twombly and Iqbal to
mean that a complaint must contain sufficient allegations to defeat any
“obvious alternative explanation” for the plaintiff’s injury. 229 In this
case, Judge Posner saw error to be an obvious alternative explanation
for the defendant’s denial of the plaintiff’s loan application. 230 He
reasoned that “errors in appraising houses are common because ‘real
estate appraisal is not an exact science.’” 231 Therefore, Judge Posner
concluded that the allegation of discrimination was not plausible and
that the district court’s dismissal should have been affirmed. 232
Based on Judge Posner’s dissent in Swanson, it is clear that his
interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement has
continued to evolve. In Smith v. Duffy, Judge Posner seemed unwilling
to apply Iqbal outside of the qualified immunity context at all. 233 In
Cooney v. Rossiter, Judge Posner held that a heightened plausibility
225

Id.
Id.
227
Id. at 407–08.
228
Id. at 408.
229
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951–52).
230
Id. at 408–09.
231
Id. at 408 (quoting Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715
(7th Cir. 1998)).
232
Id. at 407–12.
233
576 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2009).
226
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standard made sense in the case of a “paranoid pro se” whose lawsuit
threatened multiple defendants with costly discovery. 234 But in
Swanson, Judge Posner’s dissent suggested that a heightened
plausibility requirement should be imposed in even the simplest of
discrimination cases. 235 No longer is Judge Posner advocating for a
narrow reading of Twombly and Iqbal. 236 Instead, the reading that
Judge Posner advocates in Swanson is reminiscent of the “robust
gatekeeping regime” that Professors Clermont and Yeazell warn us
about 237 —if the plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient
factual allegations to override any other natural, legal explanation for
the plaintiff’s injury, the complaint will be dismissed and the gates
closed. 238
IV. SETTLING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DEBATE OVER THE
PLAUSIBILITY REQUIREMENT
In 1928, Judge Charles E. Clark said that “[i]n pleading, an
eternal dilemma presents itself: How shall we make procedural rules
definite enough to work and yet flexible enough to do justice?” 239
Judge Clark’s observation has stood the test of time, because the
United States Supreme Court is clearly still grappling with that
dilemma. In 2007, the Supreme Court thought that the standard for
pleading had become too flexible, because in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, it raised the bar by jettisoning Conley v. Gibson’s “no set of
facts” language 240 and replacing it with a heightened plausibility
requirement. 241 But, as Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Wood recently
pointed out in Swanson v. Citibank, “courts are still struggling [with]
234

583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009).
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 407–12 (Posner, J., dissenting).
236
Id. at 407.
237
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 823
238
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408 (Posner, J., dissenting).
239
CLARK, supra note 35, at vii.
240
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
241
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563–70 (2007).
235
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how much higher the Supreme Court meant to set the bar.” 242
According to Judge Wood’s majority opinion in Swanson, the Court
did not raise the bar very much. 243 According to Judge Richard
Posner’s dissent in the same case, however, the Court raised the bar
significantly. 244 Which view is a better one—the one that gives
pleading rules more bite, or the one that keeps them flexible? Put
another way, should federal courts keep the gates relatively wide open,
or should they lock them up?
A. The Two Competing Interpretations: Judge Wood’s “Could this
Have Happened?” View Versus Judge Posner’s “Obvious Alternative
Explanation” View
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Swanson v. Citibank can be characterized as a debate over which one
of two views should prevail. One view, adopted by Judge Wood in
Swanson, interprets Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement to
mean that the allegations contained in a complaint must set forth a
scenario that could have happened (i.e., the claim to relief is plausible
because the scenario alleged in the complaint could have occurred). 245
The other view, adopted by Judge Posner in his dissent in Swanson,
interprets Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement to mean that a
complaint’s allegations must contain sufficient factual detail to
override any “obvious alternative explanation” for the defendant’s
conduct (i.e., the claim to relief is plausible because there is not a more

242

Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403.
See id. at 404 (“As we understand it, the Court is saying that the plaintiff
must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that
holds together.”).
244
See id. at 408 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court would consider
error the plausible inference in this case, rather than discrimination, for it said in
Iqbal that ‘as between that ‘obvious alternative explanation’ for the [injury of which
the plaintiff is complaining] and the purposeful, invidious discrimination [the
plaintiff] asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.’”).
245
Id. at 404.
243
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natural, lawful explanation for the plaintiff’s injury). 246 Thus, the
central debate concerns whether Judge Wood’s “could this have
happened?” view or Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation”
view should prevail.
Providing a framework that helps to harmonize these competing
views, Professor Allan Ides has broken down the principles underlying
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) into three separate
requirements. 247 The first principle, “transactional sufficiency,” is the
idea that a complaint must include sufficient factual detail to move the
claim beyond an “abstract assertion of a right” to a claim that is
“premised on an actual, identifiable event.” 248 The second principle,
“procedural sufficiency,” is the idea that a complaint should include
sufficient factual detail to give the opposing party fair notice of the
claim and the grounds upon which it rests (this is Conley v. Gibson’s
notice requirement). 249 The third and final principle, “substantive
sufficiency,” is the idea that the complaint’s factual allegations should
be sufficient to give rise to a recognized legal claim. 250
Using Ides’s framework, Judge Diane Wood’s “could this have
happened?” view and Judge Richard Posner’s “obvious alternative
explanation” view differ significantly in the level of emphasis that
they place on “transactional sufficiency,” “procedural sufficiency,”
and “substantive sufficiency.” Judge Wood’s view emphasizes
“transactional sufficiency” and “procedural sufficiency.” When Judge
Wood writes that Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement means
that a complaint must provide enough factual detail “to present a story
that holds together,” 251 she asks for a minimal indication that the
complaint’s claim to relief is “premised on an actual, identifiable
246

Id. at 408 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal
Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 607 (2007).
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404.
247
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event.” 252 Under this approach, if it appears from the complaint’s
factual allegations that the underlying event could have happened, then
the complaint is sufficient. 253
But Judge Wood’s view of the requisite “transactional
sufficiency” must be interpreted in light of Twombly and Iqbal’s
holdings. Although the Court in Iqbal said that the “plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” 254 and although
the Court in Twombly said that “a well-pleaded complaint may
proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts
is improbable” 255 —both of which support Judge Wood’s liberal
reading of the cases—the Court in Iqbal went on to say that
plausibility “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” 256 So, in order to read Judge Wood’s majority
opinion in harmony with Twombly and Iqbal, one must read it as
requiring more than sheer possibility. One must read her inquiry—
“could this have happened?”—as referring to the line that divides
sheer possibility from plausibility. Judge Wood premised her holding
in Swanson by stating that “[i]t is by now well established that a
plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the
hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” 257 Thus, we can
interpret Judge Wood as equating the term “might” with sheer
plausibility, which is insufficient to state a plausible claim, and
equating the term “could” with plausibility, which is sufficient.
Additionally, as mentioned several times already, Judge Wood’s
reading of Twomby and Iqbal places much emphasis on the principle
of “procedural sufficiency.” In nearly every one of her post-Twomby
cases, Judge Wood has focused her interpretation of “plausibility” on
whether the plaintiff’s complaint provides sufficient factual detail to
252

Ides, supra note 247, at 607.
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404.
254
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
255
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
256
Id.
257
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403.
253
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give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which
it rests. 258
Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” view, on the
other hand, focuses more on “substantive sufficiency” than
“transactional sufficiency” or “procedural sufficiency.” For example,
Judge Posner described his view of the line dividing sheer possibility
and plausibility this way:
In statistics the range of probabilities is from 0 to 1, and
therefore encompasses “sheer possibility” along with
“plausibility.” It seems . . . what the Court was driving at was
that even if the district judge doesn’t think a plaintiff’s case is
more likely than not to be a winner (that is, doesn’t think p >
.5), as long as it is substantially justified that’s enough to
avert dismissal. 259
But what does Judge Posner mean by “substantially justified”? We
must read this in context with his view that Twombly and Iqbal require
courts to dismiss as implausible any claim to relief that is based upon
an injury that has an “obvious alternative explanation.” 260 So, in Judge
Posner’s view, it is not sufficient for a complaint to merely give an
indication that the plaintiff’s claim is “premised on an actual,
identifiable event” or to give the defendant notice of the claim and the
grounds upon which it rests. 261 Instead, the complaint’s factual
allegations must be sufficiently detailed to override any more natural,
258

See Airborne Beepers & Video v. AT&T Mobility, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“Taking Erickson and Twombly together, we understand the Court to be
saying only that at some point the factual detail in a complaint may be so sketchy
that the complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the
defendant is entitled under Rule 8.”); see also Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d
634, 639 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Erickson v. Pardus . . .
put to rest any concern that Twombly signaled an end to notice pleading in the
federal courts.”).
259
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 411 (Posner, J., dissenting).
260
See id. at 408.
261
See Ides, supra note 247, at 607.
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legal explanation for the plaintiff’s injury. 262 Because a plaintiff’s
injury that has an obvious natural explanation that does not involve
wrongful conduct would not give rise to a recognized legal claim, one
can see that Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” view
places most of its emphasis on “substantive sufficiency.” 263 Notably,
Judge Wood directly disagreed with Judge Posner’s emphasis on
heightened substantive sufficiency: She wrote that plausibility “does
not imply that the district court should decide whose version to
believe, or which version is more likely than not.” 264
B. The Problem with “Judicial Experience and Common Sense”
Professor Suja A. Thomas has argued that, following Twombly
and Iqbal, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss has become the “new
summary judgment motion.” 265 Professor Thomas bases her argument,
in part, on judges’ tendency following Twombly and Iqbal to rely on
their own opinions of the sufficiency of the evidence to decide
motions to dismiss. 266 The language from Iqbal that courts must look
to their “judicial experience and common sense” 267 to decide a motion
to dismiss encourages judges to look beyond allegations of a
complaint to decide whether the claim is plausible. 268 This practice,
which is apparent in Judge Posner’s dissent in Swanson, 269 is
problematic because it tends to transform a motion to dismiss into a

262

Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408.
See Ides, supra note 247, at 607. Substantive sufficiency requires that the
complaint “allege facts sufficient to show that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
264
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 404.
265
Thomas, supra note 19, at 17.
266
Id. at 31, 41.
267
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
268
Thomas, supra note 19, at 31 (“This language in Iqbal seems to permit
judges to use their own opinions to assess the sufficiency of facts to decide motions
to dismiss similar to what we see judges do in deciding summary judgment.”).
269
See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 407–12 (Posner, J., dissenting).
263
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motion for summary judgment, thus giving judges too much power
over the parties at an early stage in the litigation. 270
1.

Comparison of Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56

On their faces, the standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
and for a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment are very different.271
Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint on motion
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 272 Rule
56 provides that summary judgment “should be rendered if . . . there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” 273 Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on defects
on the face of a pleading, while Rule 56 focuses on the lack of
disputed material facts underlying a controversy. 274
Judges are also to consider different things when deciding the
motions. 275 Traditionally, when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, judges are to look only to the allegations contained within the
four corners of the complaint. 276 The court is to assume as true all
well-pleaded facts, although not legal conclusions, 277 and then to
270

Thomas, supra note 19, at 31.
Id. at 28.
272
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
273
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
274
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
275
Thomas, supra note 19, at 28.
276
Karagiannis v. Allcare Dental Mgmt., LLC, No. 10-2085, 2010 WL
3724767, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2010) (citing Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith
Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)) (“When considering a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court is limited to the allegations contained in
the pleadings.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”).
277
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (holding that, “[a]lthough for the purposes
of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as
true, we ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation’”).
271
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determine if those facts “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” 278 If the parties present facts outside of the pleadings in
support of or in opposition to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
court is to treat the motion as one for summary judgment. 279
When deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56,
on the other hand, a court is to look to “the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits.” 280 Judges are not
limited to the four corners of the complaint but are to examine all of
the evidence that has been developed through discovery. 281 If these
materials reveal a “genuine issue of material fact,” then summary
judgment is improper. 282 A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” 283
2.

Convergence of Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment

Professor Thomas argues that Twombly and Iqbal threaten to
convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into the new motion for
summary judgment. 284 She provides three similarities between the
motion to dismiss following Twombly and Iqbal and the motion for
summary judgment. 285 First, following Twombly and Iqbal, a
complaint must state a claim that is plausible, 286 which is also a
standard that the Supreme Court has used in deciding summary

278

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).
280
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
284
Thomas, supra note 19, at 17.
285
Id. at 29–31.
286
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
279
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judgment motions. 287 Professor Thomas points out that, in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court cited one of its seminal
summary judgment opinions, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 288 as support for its new plausibility
requirement. 289 In Matsushita, the Supreme Court held, in part, that
summary judgment was proper and that there was no genuine issue of
material fact concerning the plaintiff’s allegations of antitrust
conspiracy where it was “equally plausible” based on the evidence
presented that the defendants’ conduct was entirely legal.290
The second similarity is that judges tend to draw inferences in
favor of both the moving and the non-moving parties when deciding
both motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. 291
Professor Thomas points to the Court’s decision in Matsushita, in
which it held that, although a court must view “the inferences to be
drawn from the underlying facts . . . in the light most favorable” to the
non-moving party, it must view these inferences “in light of the
competing inferences.” 292 Professor Thomas also points to the Court’s
decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, in which the Court drew inferences in
favor of the parties moving for dismissal as well as the non-moving
parties. 293 In Twombly, the Court drew the inference in favor of the
moving party that the defendants’ conduct was consistent with
uncoordinated monopolistic behavior. 294 In Iqbal, the Court drew the
inference in favor of the moving party that the defendants’ policy of
arresting Arab-Americans was consistent with a “nondiscriminatory
intent” to detain aliens who were illegally in the United States and
287

Thomas, supra note 19, at 29 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
288
475 U.S. 574.
289
Thomas, supra note 19, at 25 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561 n.7).
290
Id. at 20 (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588).
291
Id. at 30.
292
Id. at 20 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88).
293
Id. at 25, 27 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567–69 n.13; Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949–50 (2009)).
294
See 550 U.S. at 568–70.
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who had potential connections to the September 11 terrorist attacks. 295
The Court in Iqbal held that judges must use their “judicial experience
and common sense” to draw these inferences and that a claim is
plausible only when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” 296
The third similarity between the motion to dismiss following
Twombly and Iqbal and the motion for summary judgment is judges’
reliance on their own opinions of the sufficiency of the evidence to
decide the motions. 297 Professor Thomas argues that judges deciding
motions for summary judgment rely on their own opinions of the
sufficiency of the evidence—judges use phrases like “a reasonable
jury could find” but nonetheless often disagree over whether summary
judgment is proper. 298 Regarding motions to dismiss, on the other
hand, the Supreme Court in Iqbal expressly stated that judges are to
rely on their “judicial experience and common sense” to decide such
motions. 299 Professor Thomas quotes one commentator who criticized
this language because “it obviously licenses highly subjective
judgments . . . [t]his is a blank check for federal judges to get rid of
cases they disfavor.” 300 As discussed below, the invitation for judges
to look to their “judicial experience and common sense” to decide
motions to dismiss gives them too much power over parties at an early
stage in litigation. 301

295

See 129 S. Ct. at 1951.
Thomas, supra note 19, at 27 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50).
297
Id. at 31.
298
Id.
299
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
300
Thomas, supra note 19, at 32 (quoting Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11
Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, N.Y.TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A10).
301
Id. at 41.
296
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The Problem with Converting the Motion to Dismiss into a
Motion for Summary Judgment

As Professor Thomas argues, one important problem with
converting the motion to dismiss into the “new summary judgment
motion” 302 is that the parties have not had the opportunity to develop
evidence through discovery at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 303 A judge
deciding a motion for summary judgment examines all of the evidence
that the parties have uncovered through discovery to determine
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether a
“reasonable jury” could find for the non-movant. 304 At this stage, the
parties have had the opportunity to develop evidence through
discovery and to present it to the judge in a persuasive manner. 305
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, on the other hand, the parties have
not had the opportunity to develop evidence through discovery. 306 The
judge is limited to those factual allegations contained in the
complaint. 307 Asking a judge to determine whether those factual
allegations present a plausible claim is akin to asking the judge to
decide whether the evidence before him on a motion for summary
judgment presents a genuine issue of material fact, but without the
benefit of having fully-developed evidence before him. 308 Therefore,
when a judge is permitted to look to his or her “judicial experience and
common sense” to determine plausibility, the judge is given great
power over the parties. 309 The judge is granted the power to draw
inferences in favor of the defendant moving for dismissal based upon
his or her opinion of the sufficiency of the scant allegations in the

302

Id.at 17.
Id. at 41.
304
Id.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
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complaint. 310 The risk is that judges will dismiss cases that would
have been plausible had the parties had the opportunity to develop
evidence through discovery and present it to the judge. 311
C. An Argument for Judge Wood’s Interpretation of the Plausibility
Requirement
Analyzing the majority and dissenting opinions in Swanson using
Professor Thomas’s “new summary judgment motion” argument and
Professor Ides’s Rule 8(a)(2) framework leads to two conclusions.
First, Judge Posner’s “obvious alternative explanation” view of
Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility requirement gives judges too much
power to rely on their own opinions of what is plausible and focuses
too heavily on determinations of substantive sufficiency at the motionto-dismiss stage. Second, Judge Wood’s “could this have happened”
view is better because it limits a court’s power to draw inferences in
favor of the moving party and requires only a minimal, yet
appropriate, amount of transactional and substantive sufficiency at the
motion-to-dismiss stage.
1.

Judge Posner’s Interpretation Gives Judges Too Much Power over
Parties at the Motion-to-Dismiss Stage

Judge Posner’s interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility
requirement places too much power in the hands of judges when
deciding motions to dismiss. In his dissent in Swanson, Judge Posner
did exactly what Professor Thomas warns us about: He delved into an
extensive discussion of matters beyond the allegations of the
complaint to conclude that the plaintiff’s claim of discrimination was
not plausible. 312 Judge Posner looked to the frequency of errors in real
estate appraisals and to the difficulty of obtaining credit as a result of
310

Id. at 29–31, 41.
Id. at 39.
312
See Swanson v. Citibank, 614 F.3d 400, 408–09 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.,
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the housing crisis. 313 These are considerations that went beyond the
complaint’s allegations and that would have been more properly
considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment than a motion
to dismiss. 314
Judge Posner also drew inferences in favor of the defendants
moving for dismissal in Swanson. Although Judge Posner agreed that
the court must assume to be true the plaintiff’s allegation that the
defendants’ low appraisal of her home was a mistake, he immediately
countered that assumption by drawing an inference in favor of the
defendants. 315 Judge Posner wrote that, although “[w]e must assume
that the appraisal was a mistake, and the house is worth considerably
more, . . . errors in appraising a house are common because ‘real estate
is not an exact science.’” 316 But why is error the more obvious
inference in this case? Why does error so strongly outweigh
discrimination as a plausible explanation for the defendants’ low
appraisal of Gloria Swanson’s home? Judge Posner says that “real
estate appraisal is not an exact science,” 317 but does that necessarily
mean that it is implausible that a real estate appraiser could
discriminate on the basis of race? Did Gloria Swanson’s complaint
present only a “sheer possibility” of racial discrimination because
“real estate appraisal is not an exact science”? Judge Posner ignored
these questions and, without explanation, jumped to the conclusion
that “[t]he Supreme Court would consider error the plausible inference
in this case, rather than discrimination.” 318 But why was error
conclusively more plausible than discrimination?
The problem with Judge Posner’s approach is that it gives a judge
too much power to look to his or her “judicial experience and common
sense” to decide a motion to dismiss. The judge’s experience and
313
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See Thomas, supra note 19, at 31.
315
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316
Id. (quoting Latimore v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 151 F.3d 712, 715 (7th
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317
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common sense should be sources for an objective standard, not
sources for extrajudicial facts or considerations upon which to base
inferences of plausibility. 319 In Swanson, Judge Posner went beyond
the allegations of the complaint to look toward the frequency of error
in real estate appraisals and the difficulty of obtaining credit following
the housing crisis. 320 But the parties had not had the opportunity to
conduct discovery or to present evidence that would counter Judge
Posner’s findings. At this early motion-to-dismiss stage, the parties
would have been powerless to counter Judge Posner’s conclusion that
error was a more plausible inference than discrimination.
2. Judge Wood’s Interpretation of the Plausibility Requirement
Requires the Appropriate Level of Transactional and Substantive
Sufficiency
Judge Wood’s interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal’s plausibility
requirement, on the other hand, exhibits restraint and is fairer to the
parties at the early motion-to-dismiss stage. Under Judge Wood’s
approach, a court is not to “draw on its judicial experience and
common sense” such that it draws inferences in favor of the movant
based upon considerations beyond the allegations of the complaint. 321
In fact, Judge Wood warned against this: “‘Plausibility’ in this context
does not imply that the district court should decide whose version to
believe, or which version is more likely than not.” 322 Judge Wood also
warned against granting a motion to dismiss based solely upon
inferences favoring the movant: “[I]t is not necessary to stack up
inferences side by side and allow the case to go forward only if the
plaintiff’s inferences seem more compelling than the opposing
inferences.” 323 Instead, Judge Wood directed courts to draw on their
“judicial experience and common sense” only to ask if the plaintiff has
319

See Thomas, supra note 19, at 31, 41.
See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 408–09.
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given “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a
story that holds together.” 324 The central question for Judge Wood is
“could these things have happened?” 325 In answering this question,
there is no room for judges to look towards facts or considerations
beyond the complaint to draw inferences in favor of the defendant; a
judge assessing whether a complaint’s “story” could have happened
will not respond with discussions of the frequency of errors in real
estate appraisals or the difficulty of obtaining credit in a bad housing
market. Instead, the judge will look solely to the factual allegations
contained in the complaint and ask whether, based upon his or her
experience and common sense, there is enough to present a plausible
claim of discrimination—is there enough to present a story of
discrimination that “holds together”? Is there more than a “sheer
possibility” of discrimination?
CONCLUSION
Judge Diane Wood’s majority opinion in Swanson v. Citibank
provides a fair approach to interpreting and applying Twombly and
Iqbal’s plausibility requirement. It is consistent with the traditional
function of pleadings in the federal courts, which is to provide “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief” 326 and to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests.” 327 After all, the Supreme Court’s
trio of Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal did not “cast any doubt on the
validity of Rule 8.” 328 The approach for which Judge Posner
advocated in his dissent, on the other hand, would give judges too
much power over the parties at a very early stage in litigation. 329 By
324
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permitting judges to look to their “judicial experience and common
sense” for facts and considerations that support inferences that favor
the party moving for dismissal, Judge Posner’s approach would
become the “robust gatekeeping regime” that scholars have warned
against. 330 Judge Wood’s inquiry into “could this have happened?” and
“does the story hold together?” provides an approach to pleadings that
is “definite enough to work and yet flexible enough to do justice.” 331

330
331

See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 22, at 823.
See CLARK, supra note 35, at vii.
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